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iRaqis sue PRivaTe u.s. miliTaRy 
coNTRacToRs iN u.s. couRT
On September 16, 2007, a shootout 
occurred at a busy highway intersection 
in Baghdad, Iraq. Blackwater USA, a pri-
vate security corporation contracted by the 
U.S. government to provide security to 
U.S. officials and military support to the 
region, allegedly opened fire in the middle 
of the intersection without provocation, 
killing 17 Iraqi civilians. Many bystand-
ers were shot when they attempted to flee. 
Blackwater alleges that it responded in self-
defense after its guards were fired upon. 
The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) reported that among the 17 killings, 
only three may have been justified by the 
guards’ fear that they were in imminent 
danger and the remaining 14 killings were 
without cause.
The recent events were neither the 
first instances of Blackwater’s violent 
actions in Iraq, nor unique. In May 2005 a 
Blackwater helicopter and armored vehicle 
released a potent tear gas without prov-
ocation against Iraqi and U.S. soldiers 
guarding a checkpoint, which rendered 
soldiers and highway travelers temporarily 
blind. On September 17, after learning that 
there had been over 200 recorded shoot-
ings by Blackwater guards in Iraq since 
2005, the Interior Ministry of Iraq revoked 
Blackwater’s license to operate in Iraq. 
In addition to recent Iraqi investiga-
tions, the U.S. Congress reported that on 
at least two occasions, Blackwater paid 
modest sums to the families of victims in 
exchange for their silence. Further findings 
allege that U.S. State Department officials 
approved of such payments. 
While the FBI and U.S. Department of 
Justice (DOJ) investigations remain ongo-
ing, the victims of the September 16 attack 
are seeking justice through civil litigation 
in the U.S. court system. On October 
11, the Center for Constitutional Rights 
(CCR) filed a complaint on behalf of an 
injured Iraqi civilian and three deceased 
victims’ families, later amended to two 
injured civilians and five families, against 
Blackwater USA, Blackwater Security 
Consulting LLC, the Prince Group (a hold-
ing company), and Erik Prince (founder of 
Blackwater). The complaint alleges that 
Blackwater “created and fostered a culture 
of lawlessness amongst its employees, 
encouraging them to act in the company’s 
financial interests at the expense of inno-
cent human life.” The complaint accuses 
Blackwater of authorizing excessive use 
of force through its failure to investigate 
or punish its employees. In addition, it 
contends that Blackwater knowingly and 
routinely deploys heavily armed soldiers in 
Baghdad who use steroids and other drugs 
that affect and impair judgment. Plaintiffs 
seek both compensatory and punitive dam-
ages. 
Meanwhile, the DOJ notified Congress 
during a private meeting in December that 
it might be unable to file charges against 
Blackwater due to a number of legal 
obstacles, including the limited immu-
nity offered to Blackwater employees in 
exchange for their testimony during the 
initial investigation into the September 16 
incident. 
The official joint recognition and con-
demnation of Blackwater’s actions by the 
Iraqi and U.S. governments is essential to 
the restoration of stability in the region, 
and the actions of private security contrac-
tors in Iraq continue to threaten the cred-
ibility and safety of U.S. military forces.
u.s. goveRNmeNT closes 
legal looPhole ThaT gRaNTed 
immuNiTy To PeRPeTRaToRs  
of geNocide
On December 21, 2007, President Bush 
signed into law the Genocide Accountability 
Act (GAA). The GAA’s closes a loophole 
that allowed individuals who participated 
in committing genocide outside the United 
States to avoid prosecution within the 
United States. Prior to the GAA, indi-
viduals could be found guilty of genocide 
only if the crime was committed within 
the United States or by a U.S. national 
outside the country. The GAA is aimed 
specifically at perpetrators of the Rwandan 
and Bosnian Genocides of the mid 1990s, 
since individuals who participated in those 
atrocities were thought to be escaping 
justice while residing in the United States 
under false pretenses. Senator Tom Coburn 
(R-OK), who voted for the passage of GAA 
stated, “Under no circumstances should an 
individual who participated in genocide 
be allowed to enjoy safe haven within the 
United States … . Persons who committed 
these heinous crimes should be punished to 
the fullest extent of the law.”
The GAA is the first legislation to be 
proposed by the Senate Subcommittee on 
Human Rights Under the Law, chaired by 
Senator Dick Durbin (D-IL). A primary aim 
of the subcommittee is to combat genocide. 
Members of the committee and legal com-
munity consider the GAA’s passage a huge 
victory. According to law professor Diane 
Orentlicher, who testified before Congress 
in February and October 2007, “By passing 
the Genocide Accountability Act of 2007, 
Congress has struck a major blow against 
the impunity that sustains perpetrators of 
ghastly crimes. From now on, those who 
have violated the basic code of human-
ity will know they cannot find sanctuary 
here.” 
While the GAA corrected an error 
in achieving justice for past genocides, 
the U.S. Congress also made efforts to 
address the current genocide in Darfur. On 
December 31, 2007, President Bush signed 
into law the Sudan Accountability and 
Divestment Act (SADA), which allows 
state and local governments within the 
United States to cease doing business with 
companies with economic ties in Sudan and 
prohibits federal contracts with any such 
companies. Under SADA, mutual funds 
and private pension managers may not sell 
investments in companies affiliated with 
Sudan, and states may prohibit debt financ-
ing for companies doing business in Sudan. 
The legislation unanimously passed both 
houses of Congress, but to ease worries 
that it could potentially interfere with his 
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ability to conduct foreign policy, President 
Bush attached a signing statement which 
permits him to overrule divestment deci-
sions by states that may interfere with the 
administration of foreign policy. Darfur 
activist groups including the Save Darfur 
Coalition, Genocide Intervention Network, 
and STAND called for President Bush 
to take measures to ensure that SADA is 
strictly enforced.
While the effectiveness of GAA and 
SADA remain to be seen, the laws gained 
passage at a time of mounting concern 
about inaction by the United States, and, 
hopefully, reflect a growing U.S. govern-
ment desire to combat genocide and bring 
its perpetrators to justice.
healThcaRe a gRoWiNg 
coNceRN To uNiTed sTaTes aNd 
PResideNTial caNdidaTes
The U.S. healthcare system is a 
key issue in the 2008 U.S. Presidential 
Election. Both Republicans and Democrats 
find numerous flaws in the current system, 
which has been described as confusing, 
exclusionary, and costly. The average U.S. 
family spent $12,106 on healthcare in 
2006. A 2005 U.S. Census Bureau report 
found that 46.6 million U.S. citizens are 
currently uninsured. The U.S. healthcare 
system is based on a blend of public and 
private for-profit healthcare. Private hospi-
tals are motivated by profit maximization 
in order to please shareholders, while there 
is little incentive to improve the quality 
of care. Not-for-profit and teaching hos-
pitals have seven and 25 percent lower 
death rates respectively, in comparison to 
for-profit hospitals. Internationally, this 
policy would pose serious questions about 
the violation of the basic human right of 
equal access to healthcare. As the country 
begins to view these statistics as a crisis, 
the candidates, mostly driven by the posi-
tions of their respective political parties, 
have responded with comprehensive plans 
detailing how each would resolve the criti-
cal issue.
The Republican candidates largely seek 
to allow the market, rather than a federally 
mandated system of universal coverage, 
to correct the country’s privatized health 
insurance system. This raises a number 
of potential human rights violations. Most 
Republicans favor a system that allows 
private insurers and public programs the 
ability to reward the healthy behavior of 
individuals. 
The Democratic approach calls for 
a system of mixed private and public 
healthcare with contribution mandates for 
employers and individuals, and tax incen-
tives designed to regulate the health insur-
ance market. Democrats seek to reverse the 
trend of falling employer-provided health-
care coverage, which has dropped from 69 
percent to 60 percent since the year 2000. 
The Democratic-proposed mandate would 
require employers to either provide cover-
age for their employees or pay into a public 
healthcare fund. The leading candidates’ 
healthcare plans are similar, with few dis-
tinguishing characteristics, including either 
mandating individual health insurance for 
every U.S. citizen or for children only. The 
primary source of funding for the candi-
dates’ programs would be the repeal of tax 
cuts granted by President Bush for indi-
viduals earning over $250,000 annually. 
While there are significant differences 
in the policies of the two political parties, 
both still fail to meet certain standards. 
Neither party supports a shift from the cur-
rent system, which focuses on healthcare 
as a commodity, to one that supports it 
as an individual right. As a result, human 
rights concepts of equity give way to a 
struggle of cost reduction and increased 
access within a privatized profit-based sys-
tem. As the war in Iraq begins to be seen as 
less of a priority in the election, domestic 
issues such as whether there is a right for 
individuals of all incomes to have access to 
healthcare have an opportunity to impact 
the election of the next U.S. president.
laTiN ameRica
hoNduRas: laTiN ameRicaN 
WaTeR TRiBuNal holds 
eNTRemaRes de hoNduRas liaBle
Before mining activities by Entremares 
de Honduras, S.A., a subsidiary of Canada’s 
Goldcorp Inc., polluted and dried up vital 
water sources, the Siria Valley’s rivers 
supplied communities in central Honduras 
with drinking water. The Honduran gov-
ernment initially ignored local complaints 
about the lack of water and water contami-
nation created by Entremares de Honduras. 
As a result, the Siria Valley Regional 
Environmental Committee took the case to 
the Latin American Water Tribunal, where 
Entremares de Honduras was found liable 
for “inappropriate use and contamination 
of water sources in the Siria Valley region 
and for causing harm and risk to the eco-
system and to human health.” 
In 1994, Entremares de Honduras, S.A. 
began to operate in Tegucigalpa. Four years 
later, an American company, Glamis Gold 
Limited, bought the Honduran company. 
The company changed hands again in 2006 
when it was purchased by Goldcorp, Inc. In 
1998, immediately after Hurricane Mitch, 
the country experienced a period of mining 
law reform stimulated by Congressional 
desire to jump start the economy. The 
General Mining Law of 1999 reduced min-
eral export regulation, guaranteed mining 
companies greater access to water supplies, 
and dismantled environmental restrictions. 
According to mining industry representa-
tives, these reforms were a response to the 
need to create more jobs and a modernized 
mining industry, and to stimulate foreign 
investment. From 1968 through 1998, not a 
single foreign company opened operations 
in Honduras. 
The government granted Entremares 
special concessions in 1998. Since then the 
company has been using cyanide to extract 
gold from mined ore, a cheap method that 
has been banned in some countries and 
severely restricted in others.
Two years later, communities living 
around the mines began to complain of 
a water shortage, water contamination, 
and an increase of illnesses and skin dis-
orders. But the complaints were futile, as 
neither the government nor Entremares 
did anything. On January 25, 2000, the 
Siria Valley Regional Environmental 
Committee denounced the destruction of 
the forest, harm to the environment, and 
contamination of the water. It called for a 
government commission, but the company 
suppressed test results confirming water 
sources were contaminated with arsenic 
and mercury. Despite the complaints and 
the hidden reports, the Ministry of Natural 
Resources and Environment (SERNA) 
allowed Entremares to dig five new wells. 
SERNA confirmed that the water 
in Siria Valley was contaminated in 
September 2006. A year later, SERNA 
imposed a one million Lempira ($55,000) 
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fine on Entremares for polluting and dam-
aging activities that violated Honduran 
environmental laws and the company’s 
contract with the government. In response, 
Entremares promised to regenerate the 
forests affected but refused to pay the 
fine. Gabino Santos Carvajal, the Director 
of the Mining Association, stated that a 
court decision was necessary to prove that 
Entremares committed a crime, and that 
scientific reports alone were insufficient. 
On the other hand, Caritas Tegucigalpa, a 
development and social service organiza-
tion, suggested that Entremares refused 
to pay because it did not want to accept 
liability, and because it suspected that the 
Honduran legal system was too weak to 
enforce a payment. 
The Siria Valley Regional Environmen-
tal Committee responded by bringing the 
case before the Latin American Water 
Tribunal, an autonomous, independent, 
and international organization of envi-
ronmental justice. Although its decision 
is non-binding, the tribunal found that 
Entremares is accountable for the damage 
to the environment as a result of irresponsi-
ble use of water in Siria Valley, Honduras. 
Entremares has not issued a response to the 
hearing. However, on October 11, 2007, 
the tribunal held that Entremares must take 
responsibility for inappropriate use and 
contamination of water sources, should 
suspend all mining activity in the valley, 
and should compensate the communities 
for the damage caused. 
Belize: suPReme couRT RuliNg 
suPPoRTs mayaN cusTomaRy 
laNd RighTs
In a landmark legal victory for Belize’s 
Maya population, the Supreme Court of 
Belize recently granted Maya communi-
ties in Southern Belize customary rights to 
and official recognition of their lands. The 
Government of Belize, however, has yet to 
demarcate and issue titles for these lands.
In Belize, the Mayans are the larg-
est indigenous group with the majority 
of them living in villages throughout the 
country. The British established some of 
these villages as official Maya indigenous 
reservations for the benefit of the Maya 
people. The Belize government asserted 
ownership to these villages. Other unof-
ficial Maya indigenous villages are located 
on currently designated “national land.” 
These communities do not enjoy the spe-
cial protections that come with the official 
recognition of a Maya indigenous reserva-
tion. Although the existence and location 
of these communities is common knowl-
edge among the people of Belize, for many 
years the government failed to recognize 
Maya land with official titles. The govern-
ment’s policy of non-recognition is based 
on British colonial explorers’ original map 
showing these lands to be uninhabited. 
Since 1993, the Government of Belize 
has granted permits to various foreign 
companies to prospect land in the Toledo 
district. The Toledo district is both recog-
nized as “national land,” and is claimed 
by the Mayans. In addition to allowing 
exploration of the land, the government has 
granted at least 17 logging concessions, 
covering a total area of 480,000 acres to 
foreign companies. The government set 
up only a fraction of the 500,000 acres as 
nine Maya reserves. Maya representatives 
filed suit in 2000 against the government, 
leading to the signing of the “Ten Points of 
Agreement,” which stipulates that the gov-
ernment recognize Maya land rights. The 
government failed to grant any land titles 
and continued to allow foreign companies 
to exploit contested land. On April 3, 2007, 
representatives of the Maya villages of 
Conejo and Santa Cruz filed claims in two 
separate lawsuits, alleging that the govern-
ment was in violation of the Constitution 
of Belize because it failed to recognize, 
protect, and respect the customary land 
rights of the Maya community based on 
traditional land use and occupation. The 
Supreme Court consolidated the lawsuits 
into one proceeding. 
On October 18, 2007, in a 67-page 
judgment, the Supreme Court of Belize 
affirmed the customary land rights of 
Mayans residing in the villages of Conejo 
and Santa Cruz. The judgment recognized 
the customary right of all Maya villages 
to their land, based on traditional use and 
occupancy. The judgment states that the 
government has violated the rights of the 
Mayans in its failure to protect their land. 
The Supreme Court asked the government 
to demarcate the rights of Mayans and 
provide them with official land titles, and 
to stop giving land use permits to outsiders. 
This is the first legal decision citing the 
recent United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, adopted by 
the General Assembly in September of last 
year. As a result, it has significant prec-
edential value for indigenous rights cases 
across the globe. 
PoPulaR RefeReNdum defeaTs 
PRoPosed veNezuelaN 
coNsTiTuTioNal chaNges 
On August 15, 2007, Venezuelan 
President Hugo Chavez proposed to amend 
33 articles of Venezuela’s 350-article con-
stitution to make it consistent with his 
socialist agenda. According to Chavez, the 
proposed reforms were necessary to com-
plete the transition to a socialist republic.
Detractors said the reforms formed part 
of a strategy to increase Chavez’s power. 
Human Rights Watch warned that the pro-
posals included changes that could violate 
international law. For example, one pro-
posal would have increased presidential 
emergency powers; giving the president 
the power to suspend fundamental due pro-
cess guarantees such as the presumption of 
innocence, the right to be tried by an inde-
pendent and impartial tribunal and the right 
against self-incrimination during a state of 
emergency. The proposed changes would 
have also allowed the president to suspend 
citizens’ rights to information. Changes 
perceived as positive included an expan-
sion of social security benefits to workers 
and an expansion of the existing constitu-
tional prohibition on discrimination based 
on sexual and political orientation.
The proposals led those Venezuelans 
in opposition to Chavez to unite. On 
November 7, 2007, an anti-referendum 
protest turned into a riot at the Central 
University of Venezuela. Several days 
before the referendum, about 160,000 peo-
ple protested in the streets. The opposition 
to President Chavez included some of 
his previous allies such as General Raul 
Baduel, former Minister of Defense, who 
publically withdrew his support of the 
government. 
On December 2, 2007, a popular ref-
erendum narrowly defeated the proposed 
amendments. Despite his loss, Chavez 
vowed to continue his struggle to build 
socialism. Three days after the elections, 
he warned U.S. to “watch out,” as he 
planned to launch a renewed offensive 
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to change the constitution. In addition, 
approximately one month later, Chavez 
announced that 2008 would be the year of 
“the three R’s;” revision, rectification, and 
re-launching. 
afRica
disPuTed elecTioN ResulTs 
sPaRk cRisis iN keNya
Kenya, once hailed as a beacon of 
African democracy, has erupted in vio-
lence following a highly disputed presiden-
tial election. The election results, in which 
President Mwai Kibaki was re-elected over 
opposition member Raila Odinga, have 
sparked accusations of election rigging 
and have led to deadly clashes between 
members of the Luos tribe, who support 
Odinga, and members of the Kikuyu tribe, 
who support Kibaki. The Luos, who make 
up about 13 percent of Kenya’s population 
of 36 million, live mostly in the western 
part of the country. They also make up a 
large portion of the population of some of 
the capital Nairobi’s most notorious slums. 
Members of the Kikuyu tribe, who have 
strong economic and political power, make 
up about 22 percent of Kenya’s population, 
and come mostly from the central region of 
the country. 
December’s election results are the clos-
est in Kenyan history, with Kibaki report-
edly beating Odinga by roughly 230,000 
votes, after 8.9 million votes had been cast. 
Odinga had been leading the polls in the 
week leading up to the election. During the 
vote-counting on December 27, opposition 
party leader Odinga was about one mil-
lion votes ahead of Kibaki. However, the 
counting process turned sour after a num-
ber of Kibaki strongholds delayed their 
voting results. Several election officers 
disappeared with ballot boxes, and others 
refused to answer their phones until Kibaki 
was eventually announced as the victor. 
These incidents prompted various 
observer groups to determine that the vote 
was unfairly handled. The European Union 
(EU) added that it had evidence of a 
rigged election. Head of the EU Election 
Observation Mission in Kenya Alexander 
Lambsdorff cited “discrepancies in vote 
counts, election observers being turned 
away from polling places, and observ-
ers being refused entrance to the elec-
toral commission vote-count room.” On 
December 31, the United States, through 
its embassy in Nairobi, voiced its concerns 
over the “serious problems experienced 
during the voting counting process… 
[which] included various anomalies with 
respect with unrealistically high voter turn-
out rates, close to 100 percent in some con-
stituencies.” International observers have 
since concluded that the election fell short 
of international best practice standards for 
democratic elections.
Immediately following the election 
results, rioters swarmed the streets, burn-
ing and looting buildings. Protesters chant-
ing “Kibaki must go!” wielded machetes 
amidst the chaos. In the days following the 
results, more incidents of violence have 
been reported. Mobs of young men, armed 
with machetes, appear to have burned 
down a church where Kikuyu tribe mem-
bers were seeking refuge from the vio-
lence. The Red Cross reported that at least 
50 people were burned to death, including 
dozens of women and children. Other 
reported injuries included gun-shot wounds 
and cuts from machete-like weapons. The 
United Nations (UN) reported that at least 
250,000 people had been displaced by the 
violence, and, as of January 7, the Kenyan 
government reported the death toll to be 
more than 500.
In an attempt to ease the escalating 
tensions and violence in the country, 
Ghanaian President John Kufuor, Head of 
the African Union (AU), arrived in Kenya 
on January 8 to mediate between opposi-
tion leader Odinga and President Kibaki. 
Odinga refused Kibaki’s invitation for an 
official meeting, however, describing the 
invitation as “public relations gimmickry.” 
The failure of the AU to mediate between 
the two parties resulted in a call for mass 
protests in 25 towns and cities by Odinga’s 
opposition party. On January 10, 2008, it 
was reported that former UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan would attempt to 
mediate between the two parties. This 
news came after Kibaki appointed 17 new 
Cabinet members, none of whom are affili-
ated with Odinga’s party. 
gRoWiNg NumBeR of accusaTioNs 
of child WiTchcRafT iNcReases 
child homelessNess iN aNgola
A rising number of children in Angola 
are being accused of engaging in witch-
craft. Officials from one northern Angolan 
town report as many as 400 street chil-
dren that have been accused of witchcraft, 
abused, and abandoned by their fami-
lies. Furthermore, a report issued by the 
National Institute for the Child described 
a “massive” number of children accused of 
engaging in witchcraft. Fear of witchcraft 
is a common among Angola’s Bantu: many 
Bantu believe that witches can communi-
cate with the world of the dead, causing 
the alleged witches’ victims misfortune, 
illness, and death. Families faced with 
disruptions in their lives will often blame 
a child “witch” for causing the disruptions 
and cast him or her out of the home. 
According to Angolan officials, the ris-
ing number of children accused of witch-
craft can be attributed to the long conflict 
that has burdened Angolan families with 
many hardships. Angola endured 27 years 
of war, leaving a large number of children 
orphaned. Other families struggled to feed 
and sustain themselves during these years. 
As a result, families unable to take care 
of their children will often accuse them of 
witchcraft to justify their expulsion from 
the home. 
The Angolan government has been 
campaigning against the widely held belief 
in child witchcraft. In October 2007, the 
Angolan government participated in the 
Second Pan-African Forum on Children. 
In addition, Angolan delegates participated 
in a United Nations meeting devoted to 
children’s rights. The Angolan government 
is striving to prioritize discussions about 
“neglect, abuse, physical violence, emo-
tional violence and discrimination against 
children … and the phenomenon of chil-
dren accused of witchcraft.”
zamBiaN WomeN face 
oBsTRucTioN To hiv medicaTioN
A recent report by Human Rights 
Watch (HRW) describes the abuses faced 
by Zambian women who are prevented 
access to antiretroviral medication for 
their treatment of HIV. According to the 
report, approximately 17 percent of the 
adult Zambian population has HIV/AIDS. 
Women make up about 57 percent of this 
number. 
Zambian women face increased risks 
of violence and abuse at the hands of their 
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spouses, even upon discussion of HIV test-
ing and treatment, and the resulting fear 
has prevented them from seeking services 
from clinics, including HIV status testing. 
This has delayed pursuits of HIV/AIDS 
treatment. These delays have resulted in 
many women missing clinic appointments, 
while others are unable to keep up with 
their medication. 
In addition to the fear of spousal abuse, 
Zambian women are also facing obstruc-
tion to property rights. Women in Zambian 
society traditionally do not have property 
rights equal to those of men. Divorced or 
widowed women fear losing their homes 
or their land. As a result, women often feel 
forced to remain in dependent, abusive 
relationships or marriages. According to 
HRW, these women “struggled to pay for 
transport to clinics for HIV treatment and 
counseling and to afford the food they 
need for treatment to succeed.” Nada Ali, a 
researcher in the Women’s Rights Division 
of HRW commented, “Unless the Zambian 
government introduces legal and health 
system reform and removes the barriers to 
HIV treatment that women face, gender-
based abuses will continue to shatter the 
lives of countless Zambian women in acute 
need of antiretroviral treatments … .” 
The HRW report calls for the Zambian 
government to take the necessary steps to 
establish legislation, both civil and crimi-
nal, that will remedy and prevent domestic 
violence, and to finalize the draft constitu-
tion, which specifically includes provisions 
that prohibit discrimination against women 
on the basis of law, custom, culture, or 
tradition. Additionally, HRW is calling for 
the government to allow healthcare provid-
ers to respond more effectively to issues of 
gender-based abuses and violence. 
middle easT aNd NoRTh afRica
moRocco: aRResTs foR 
homosexual coNducT violaTe 
RighT To PRivacy
On December 10, 2007, the Court of 
First Instance in Ksar el-Kbir, Morocco 
convicted six men for violating Article 489 
of the Moroccan Penal Code by engag-
ing in homosexual conduct. Article 489 
“criminalizes lewd or unnatural acts with 
an individual of the same sex,” with sen-
tences between six months and three years 
in prison and fines of 120 to 1,200 dir-
hams ($15 to $150). The men have been 
in detention since they were first arrested 
by police in November 2007, after a video 
of a private party that the men allegedly 
attended circulated on YouTube. Press 
reports claimed the party was a gay mar-
riage. The court sentenced three defendants 
to six months in prison, two defendants 
to four months, and the sixth, who was 
also charged with the unauthorized sale of 
alcohol, to ten months. The case prompted 
violent protests in which hundreds of men 
and women denounced the alleged actions 
of the men involved.
The case raised two major human 
rights issues. First, criminalizing homo-
sexual conduct is a violation of human 
rights under international law, and as such, 
Article 489 of the Moroccan Penal Code 
violates international law. Second, even if 
one accepts the law as valid, the accused 
were convicted without sufficient evidence 
to prove that there was an Article 489 
violation; raising an arbitrary detention 
concern.
Human Rights Watch (HRW) main-
tains that criminalizing consensual, adult 
homosexual conduct violates human 
rights protection in international law. 
The International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), a treaty which 
Morocco has ratified, bars interference 
with the right to privacy. According to 
Article 17 of the ICCPR, “No one shall 
be subjected to unlawful interference with 
his [or her] privacy.” Thus, arresting indi-
viduals for any private sexual activity 
would be a human rights violation. In addi-
tion, the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee (UNHCR), which monitors 
implementation of the ICCPR, has explic-
itly condemned laws prohibiting consen-
sual homosexual conduct as violations of 
the ICCPR. UNHCR has no enforcement 
power but may make recommendations to 
the UN General Assembly.
A trial judge convicted the men despite 
the fact that the prosecution did not prove 
a violation of Article 489 of the Moroccan 
Penal Code. In addition to a lack of con-
clusive evidence demonstrating that the 
men were in fact at the party in question, 
the video also contained no indications of 
sexual activity. Furthermore, the video was 
the only evidence offered to support the 
homosexual conduct violation. The trial 
judge refused to release the men provision-
ally, pending appeals.
HRW has appealed to the Moroccan 
government to set aside the criminal ver-
dicts in the case. In a letter to Moroccan 
Justice Minister Abdelwahed Radi, HRW 
urged the government to drop the charges 
and release the men. In light of violence 
that ensued following their arrests, the let-
ter also implored the government to ensure 
the men’s safety. The Moroccan govern-
ment has yet to respond. HRW asserts that 
the Moroccan government must uphold 
their international human rights obligations 
and release the men immediately.
saudi dissideNT BloggeR 
aRResTed foR PoliTical acTivism
Popular Saudi blogger Fouad al-Farhan 
was arrested in December for his online 
support of ten political activists that the 
Saudi government accuses of supporting 
terrorism. This is the first reported arrest 
of an online critic of the government in 
the kingdom. Among the thousands of 
male and female bloggers in the kingdom, 
Farhan is one of the few who uses his real 
name. Through his blog (www.alfarhan.
org), Farhan criticizes corruption and calls 
for political reform. According to Farhan’s 
wife, he was arrested at his Jiddah office 
and then brought by authorities home, 
where his laptop was confiscated.
Although Farhan has not been offi-
cially charged with a crime, Major General 
Mansour al-Turki asserted that Farhan was 
arrested for “violating rules not related to 
state security.” This suggests that Farhan’s 
blog was not deemed to be dangerous to 
the national security interests of Saudi 
Arabia. On the contrary, the circumstances 
surrounding Farhan’s arrest point to the 
Saudi Arabian government exerting its 
power to suppress unpalatable political 
criticism. Since his arrest, Farhan has been 
held in indefinite detention without charge 
or trial.
Saudi Arabia is an absolute monarchy 
that restricts freedom of speech and press. 
The government does not allow political 
parties or civil rights groups to exist, nor 
does it permit public gatherings. Since 
King Abdullah took the throne in 2005, 
official tolerance of criticism and debate 
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has grown. According to the U.S. State 
Department’s latest human rights report, 
however, news outlets remain censored, 
and internet access is restricted. In early 
December Farhan had been warned that he 
would be detained because of his online 
support for a group of men arrested in 
February 2007 who were being held with-
out charge or trial. The Jiddah-based group 
— made up of academics, businessmen, 
and one former judge — had been accused 
of supporting terrorism. The men’s attor-
ney said they were arrested for political 
activism and their plans to form a civil 
rights group.
Under Article 19 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 
“everyone has the right to freedom of 
opinion and expression; this right includes 
freedom to hold opinions without inter-
ference and to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas through any media 
and regardless of frontiers.” The UDHR 
is a declaration rather than a treaty, but 
it embodies fundamental principles that 
are accepted as customary international 
law. Hence, Farhan’s case seems to fall 
squarely under Article 19: under interna-
tional law, bloggers should be protected 
from criminal charges that are based on 
their political criticism of a government. 
While the Saudi Arabian government has 
violated a recognized principle of interna-
tional law by arresting Farhan, the UDHR 
provides no enforcement mechanism to 
compel the Saudi Arabian government to 
respect bloggers’ freedom of expression.
More than 200 bloggers in Saudi Arabia 
have voiced opposition to Farhan’s arrest, 
and bloggers from around the world are 
advocating for his release. Farhan’s friends 
have maintained his blog while he is in 
detention. In an e-mail written prior to 
his arrest, Farhan indicated that he would 
remain in custody for three days at most 
if he agreed to sign a letter of apology. 
But Farhan has refused to apologize for 
his blog content, and, thus, continues to be 
detained at the Ministry of Interior’s secu-
rity service headquarters in Jiddah.
isRael fuel cuTs To gaza sTiR 
feaRs of a humaNiTaRiaN cRisis
In early January, the Israeli Supreme 
Court rejected a request for an injunc-
tion against fuel cuts to the Gaza Strip. 
The Court refused to grant the injunction 
because the ten Palestinian and Israeli 
human rights groups responsible for the 
request failed to prove that the fuel cuts 
would harm humanitarian aid work. Israel 
strategically implemented the fuel cuts to 
stop daily rocket fire at Israel by Gaza mili-
tants. The Court ruled that reducing fuel 
supplies could hinder the militants’ offen-
sive against border towns. The potential for 
the situation to escalate into a humanitar-
ian crisis, however, prompted the Court 
to monitor the effects of the fuel cuts on 
Gaza’s civilians.
According to Gisha, one of the human 
rights group that challenged the fuel cuts, 
these measures do not stop aggression but 
serve to punish the civilian population 
of Gaza. This situation creates a balance 
of human suffering on both sides of the 
border. HRW alleges that Israel’s deci-
sion to cut the fuel is a violation of a basic 
principle of international humanitarian law 
that prohibits a government that controls 
a territory from attacking or withholding 
objects essential to the survival of the 
civilian population. The act also alleg-
edly violates Israel’s duty as an occupying 
power to safeguard the health and welfare 
of the population under occupation. Israeli 
officials, however, have declared Gaza a 
“hostile territory,” and claim that Israel is 
no longer obliged under international law 
to supply utilities to the civilian popula-
tion. HRW asserts that this is a misstate-
ment of humanitarian law, and that a mere 
declaration does not negate the status and 
obligations of an occupying power.
Israeli officials also noted that while 
Gaza uses the fuel received from Israel 
to power its electrical plant, about 70 
percent of its electricity is routed directly 
from Israel through cables. This supply of 
electricity has not been stopped as a result 
of the fuel cuts. One Health Ministry offi-
cial, however, has warned that a continued 
embargo could produce a health catastro-
phe in which doctors would have to cut 
electricity to infants in maternity wards or 
patients in open heart surgery.
On January 22, Israeli Defense Minister 
Ehud Barak said that he would allow a sin-
gle shipment of fuel and medical supplies 
into the Gaza Strip. Prior to this conces-
sion, UN officials warned that food aid to 
hundreds of thousands of residents would 
be suspended because UN trucks would 
run out of fuel. While a single shipment 
of fuel may temporarily alleviate fears of 
imminent crisis, the Israeli government’s 
commitment to the fuel cutoff suggests that 
humanitarian concerns will continue.
euRoPe
azeRBaiJaNi goveRNmeNT 
suPPResses fReedom of PRess
Ilgar Nasibov, a correspondent for the 
U.S. government-funded Radio Liberty, 
was convicted of slander and sentenced 
to three months imprisonment in what 
was an alleged violation of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. Nasibov’s 
imprisonment in December 2007 made 
him the tenth journalist to serve jail time in 
Azerbaijan that year. Media repression is 
a recurring problem in Azerbaijan, which 
imprisons more journalists than any other 
country in Europe or Central Asia and 
has the fifth-highest number of reporters 
behind bars in the world.
Nasibov, who reports regularly on 
human rights violations from Azerbaijan’s 
semi-independent and geographically-
separated region of Nakhchivan, was 
convicted of slander following events in 
early November. The Deputy Chief of 
the Nakhchivan City Police Department 
accused Nasibov’s wife Malahet Nasibova, 
also a journalist who frequently reports 
on human rights abuses in the region, of 
being a “traitor.” Nakhchivan Police Chief 
Ershad Ibrahimov then filed a slander 
lawsuit against Nasibov based on an email 
Nasibov sent to the President of Azerbaijan, 
complaining that Nakhchivan journalists 
were routinely harassed by local police. 
Nasibov was convicted of slander under 
Article 147.1 of the Azerbaijan Criminal 
Code, which typically only applies to mass 
media. It remains unclear how Ibrahimov 
learned of the email and its contents. 
Nasibov was reportedly denied legal 
representation and taken to the basement of 
the police department — where torture has 
reportedly taken place in the past — imme-
diately following his conviction. While he 
was in prison, the Azerbaijan Department 
of the Interior searched Nasibov’s home 
and confiscated the couple’s computer 
and disks. This search was carried out in 
connection with a separate slander lawsuit 
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filed against the Nasibov by Isa Habibeyli, 
a member of Azerbaijan’s Parliament and 
Director of Nakhchivan State University.
Following international outcry, Nasibov 
was released four days after being jailed. 
The Nakhchivan City Court annulled the 
original slander suit and 90-day sentence 
but sentenced the journalist to one year of 
probation in the libel suit brought by Isa 
Habibeyi. Nasibov reported that although 
he was not subjected to physical torture, as 
many feared, the Nakhchivan authorities 
did put him under severe psychological 
pressure and threatened him.
Critics, including the Council of 
Europe and the U.S. Department of State, 
have issued statements of disapproval in 
response to the deterioration of media free-
dom in Azerbaijan. They declared the gov-
ernment’s treatment of Nasibov a violation 
of the freedom of expression enshrined in 
Article 10 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights.
gaddafi’s PaRis visiT casTs 
douBT oN saRkozy’s commiTmeNT 
To humaN RighTs
French President Nicolas Sarkozy faced 
strong criticism after hosting Libyan leader 
Muammar Gaddafi in Paris for five days 
in December. The trip was meant to sym-
bolize improving relations between Libya 
and Europe and marked Gaddafi’s first 
visit to France in 34 years. Since emerging 
from diplomatic isolation in 2003, Gaddafi 
has attempted to strengthen his ties with 
the West by renouncing plans to develop 
weapons of mass destruction and taking 
responsibility for past terrorist acts.
Sarkozy is the first European leader 
to welcome Gaddafi since he released six 
foreign medical workers in July 2007. 
The French president’s involvement in the 
release was subjected to harsh criticism 
given the nature of Gaddifi’s actions; the 
five Bulgarian nurses and one Palestinian 
doctor were unlawfully jailed and put on 
death row after being accused of deliber-
ately infecting hundreds of children with 
HIV in 1999. Plans for Gaddafi’s trip 
to Paris as well as preliminary business 
arrangements were made while Sarkozy 
visited Libya immediately after the nurses’ 
and doctor’s release. In connection with 
the prisoners’ release, the European Union 
and Libya signed a memorandum of 
understanding in July 2007, which also 
suggested areas of future collaboration 
between Europe and Libya. Libya’s ties 
with Europe continued to strengthen in 
October 2007, when the European Union 
General Affairs and External Relations 
Council continued negotiating with Libya 
on a framework agreement concerning 
collaboration on areas of mutual interest, 
including migration and human rights.
The primary purpose of Gaddafi’s 
December visit to Paris was to nego-
tiate business with Sarkozy. Contracts 
signed by the two leaders will amount 
to revenue of approximately ten billion 
euros for France, with Libya agreeing 
to purchase aircrafts, military helicopters, 
armored vehicles and missiles. France is 
also expected to provide Libya with a 
nuclear reactor. During the trip, Gaddafi 
had an audience with the French President 
twice, met with parliament, and attended a 
dinner at the Presidential Palace on World 
Human Rights Day. 
The French public questions whether 
Sarkozy has sacrificed his commitment 
to human rights, which he declared at 
the beginning of his presidency, in favor 
of profits by making business deals with 
a leader who has a questionable human 
rights record. Public disapproval became 
even more intense after Gaddafi publicly 
accused France of abusing immigrants at 
the United Nations Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization headquarters in 
Paris and denied that he and Sarkozy had 
discussed the subject of human rights in 
their first meeting.
Sarkozy notably faced criticism from 
his own staff. Rama Yade, the French 
Junior Minister for Human Rights, declared 
that Gaddafi needed to accept that France 
“isn’t a doormat upon which a leader, 
whether terrorist or not, can come to wipe 
off the blood of his crimes.” Much of the 
controversy stems from Libya’s refusal 
to extradite the terrorists responsible for 
the explosion of Pan Am Flight 103 over 
Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988. In 2003, 
Libya formally accepted responsibility and 
compensated the families of those killed in 
the bombing. Many believe that Sarkozy 
should not welcome a leader who has 
admitted to involvement with terrorists.
Sarkozy has attempted to justify the 
business transactions, claiming that the 
Arab world does not consider Gaddafi 
a dictator. Sarkozy was also effective in 
requesting that Gaddafi condemn terrorism. 
The Libyan leader promptly denounced 
al Qaeda’s December car bombings in 
Algeria.
Human rights groups have responded 
to the growing ties between Libya and 
Europe with caution. They note that the 
European Union must set benchmarks for 
human rights improvements before going 
ahead with business negotiations.
geoRgia loWeRs age of 
cRimiNal ResPoNsiBiliTy
President Mikheil Saakashvili signed 
a set of amendments to the Georgian 
Criminal Code reducing the age of crimi-
nal responsibility from 14 to 12. The 
amendments will enter into force on July 
1, 2008, and were introduced in response 
to a recent increase in juvenile crime in the 
former Soviet state.
Juvenile crime in Georgia has been 
steadily rising recently, with an almost 
50 percent increase since 2005, mostly 
attributed to petty theft. According to the 
United Nations Children’s Fund’s 2007 
Juvenile Justice Assessment, the percent-
age of juvenile offenders imprisoned more 
than doubled between 2000 and 2006. 
Experts attribute the rise in teenage crime 
to a breakdown of traditional values fol-
lowing Georgia’s post-Soviet transition 
during the 1990s. 
The change in Georgian law contra-
dicts international and European norms 
that generally advocate using 18 as the age 
of criminal responsibility and emphasize 
that imprisoning children should be a last 
resort. The United Nations (UN) has issued 
several guidelines, including the Standard 
Minimum Rules for the Administration of 
Juvenile Justice (the Beijing Rules) and 
the Rules for the Protection of Juveniles 
Deprived of their Liberty. Several other 
international guidelines, including the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child and 
the European Social Charter, exemplify the 
profound international consensus against 
the imprisonment of children except under 
extreme circumstances.
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Georgian practice, in adopting a widely 
criticized zero-tolerance policy towards 
young offenders, runs counter to inter-
national standards. Through this policy, 
the Georgian government is attempting to 
deter young people from criminal behavior 
by showing them that they will face pun-
ishment for their actions. Emphasizing the 
deterrent purpose of this law, the Georgian 
government claims that judges, prosecu-
tors, and investigators with special training 
in dealing with youth will prosecute and 
try the juvenile offenders, who will then be 
imprisoned in penitentiaries that are sepa-
rate from adult facilities.
Critics note that Georgia has yet to pro-
duce these separate facilities and special-
ists. The amendments contradict the UN 
Committee on the Rights of the Child’s 
February 2007 recommendation that coun-
tries should not lower their age of criminal 
responsibility to 12. Although Georgia 
signed the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child, it still has not implemented its 
guidelines. Critics believe that while low-
ering the age of criminal responsibility will 
result in the imprisonment of more chil-
dren, it will not deter juvenile crime. 
Organizations advocating children’s 
rights, including the UN and the European 
Network of Ombudspeople for Children, 
suggest that juvenile offenders imprisoned 
at an early age are more likely to con-
tinue on a criminal path throughout their 
lives. These organizations suggest that a 
more effective strategy for dealing with 
Georgia’s rise in juvenile crime would be 
to adopt measures to educate, reintegrate, 
and rehabilitate young offenders, as sug-
gested in the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child. In this way, juveniles could still 
understand the gravity of their behavior, 
but learn how to become adults that con-
tribute to Georgian society.
ceNTRal aNd souTh asia
sRi laNkaN suPReme couRT 
oRdeRs BaN oN NighTTime 
coRdoN-aNd-seaRch oPeRaTioNs
On January 7, 2008, the Supreme Court 
of Sri Lanka issued an order banning 
cordon-and-search operations under the 
Emergency Proclamation of 2006 between 
the hours of 9:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m., 
except in extraordinary circumstances. The 
Court also ordered that at least one police 
officer be present during military searches 
and arrests in emergency situations. The 
order was an interim response to a petition 
filed by the Ceylon Workers’ Federation 
(CFW) in opposition to the arrests of 2,000 
Tamils following a bomb explosion. While 
most of those arrested were released after 
they proved their identity, some remained 
in detention. The Court ordered the imme-
diate release of 198 detained prisoners and 
decided to look into the CFW’s petition in 
February. 
Cordon-and-search operations allow 
the army to seal off areas, preventing 
people from entering or exiting while 
security forces arrest people within the 
secured area. Entire communities of Tamil 
people have been intimidated by the army 
during these nighttime cordon-and-search 
operations even though many were not 
part of the Liberation Tamil Tigers Ealam 
(LTTE), a separatist group that many iden-
tify as a terrorist organization. Human 
rights activists describe the operations as 
“collective punishment” that penalizes 
communities for the crimes of a few mem-
bers and argue that such raids frighten and 
harass residents. 
The Emergency Proclamation of 2006 
allowed security forces to undertake search 
operations and gave them power to arrest 
and detain people for an indefinite period 
of time in areas of violence. This provi-
sion, which allows arbitrary searches and 
arrests for unspecified periods, violates 
Article 9 of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, to which Sri 
Lanka is a signatory. After the Emergency 
Proclamation came into effect, human 
rights groups reported a drastic increase 
in disappearances and killings. In 2007, 
400 Tamils were evicted from the capital 
city of Colombo and forced to the northern 
and eastern regions of the country, where 
Tamils have a majority. After international 
outcry over these forced evictions, the gov-
ernment allowed the evicted Tamils back 
into Colombo. 
The Court ordered all permanent road 
blocks illegal and unnecessary following 
a petition by the Deputy Inspector General 
of Police requesting that the court bar 
parking of vehicles along a busy route to 
prevent road-side bombs. In December 
2007, the Centre for Policy Alternatives 
petitioned the Court to stop mass arrests 
of Tamils and asked the court to establish 
specific guidelines for authorities to follow 
in arresting and detaining persons dur-
ing the emergency. These guidelines will 
become increasingly necessary to protect 
against abuses by Sri Lankan authorities 
now that the truce agreement with the 
LTTE has ended. 
The Tamils have been fighting for 
an independent state for 35 years. In the 
past, the Court has been criticized for 
acting in collusion with the government 
to suppress fundamental rights by reduc-
ing criminal law safeguards. Recent cases 
suggest, however, that the Court is now 
discouraging human rights abuses against 
the Tamils.
high couRT of calcuTTa fiNds 
laNd acquisiTioN legal
The High Court of Calcutta recently 
held that West Bengal’s acquisition of 
private land for a car factory was legal. 
In late 2006, one of the world’s larg-
est manufacturers of commercial vehicles, 
Tata Motors, sought the help of the West 
Bengal government to identify a loca-
tion for a new manufacturing facility. 
The West Bengal Industrial Development 
Corporation (WBIDC), a state body, iden-
tified 1,000 acres of agricultural land in 
Singur for this purpose. WBIDC located 
farmers that could prove legal title to the 
land, compensated them and then trans-
ferred land ownership to Tata Motors. 
In February 2007, farmers, human 
rights activists, and lawyers petitioned the 
High Court of Calcutta, arguing that the 
government’s acquisition of the Singur 
land for industrial development, and the 
manner in which it was obtained, was ille-
gal. Petitioners also argued that the govern-
ment’s land acquisitions were fraudulent 
and obtained against the will of the land 
owners. The Court held that the land acqui-
sition was for a public purpose and thus 
was a bona fide exercise of power by the 
government.
The Land Acquisition Act of 1894 
reflects the principle of eminent domain, 
allowing the government to acquire land 
for a public purpose. This principle is also 
manifested in Article 300-A of the Indian 
Constitution — replacing Article 42, guar-
anteeing property as a fundamental right 
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— which recognizes property rights as 
legal but not fundamental rights and allows 
the government to take land from landown-
ers as long it is done fairly. The Act was 
later amended to allow the government to 
acquire land for a company “engage[ed] in 
any industry or work for a public purpose” 
in the Land Acquisition Rules. “Public 
purpose” is not defined but has been inter-
preted to include government purchase for 
private industry; however, the government 
is required to compensate those who hold 
legal title. 
In this case, the High Court assessed 
whether the government acquired the land 
for a “public purpose.” The petitioners 
argued that the acquisition was in the inter-
est of Tata Motors and did not benefit the 
people of Singur; thus, it did not meet the 
qualifications required for a “public pur-
pose.” Furthermore, petitioners argued that 
the government of West Bengal acquired 
the land without the land holders’ consent. 
WBIDC refuted this position arguing that 
it had complied with the rules and poli-
cies and that the transaction qualified as a 
public purpose. 
In their argument, petitioners relied on 
a recent Indian Supreme Court decision 
which held that the government of Punjab 
acted illegally in its acquisition of agri-
cultural land for a tractor company. The 
High Court distinguished the two cases 
by emphasizing that the compensation in 
the Punjab case was minimal: the state 
had only paid 100 rupees (approximately 
$2.50) to the land owners. Furthermore, 
the High Court pointed out that the tractor 
company actually made the land purchase 
directly. In contrast, the West Bengal gov-
ernment compensated the Singur landown-
ers itself and then transferred the land to 
the WBIDC, which entered into a lease 
with Tata Motors. Taking these issues into 
consideration, the High Court held that 
the Singur land acquisition was acquired 
in the public interest, was acquired fairly, 
and was legal under India’s land acquisi-
tion laws.
For the past two years, similar land 
disputes involving government acquisition 
of private land for industry have led to vio-
lent protests. To date, hundreds of private 
industrial projects have been approved by 
the Indian government, and hundreds more 
are still pending. Petitioners in this case 
plan to file an appeal to the Supreme Court 
of India. 
uzBekisTaNi Refugees iN 
kyRgyzsTaN PReseNT NeW  
legal quesTioNs
After the Andijan massacre of May 
2005, in which hundreds of protesting 
Uzbekistani civilians were killed by gov-
ernment troops, Uzbekistanis have been 
seeking asylum in Kyrgyzstan and other 
neighboring countries. Some refugees have 
obtained asylum through the Kyrgyzstani 
government. Many, however, have not 
applied for asylum in Kyrgyzstan due to 
fear of being returned to Uzbekistan by 
Kyrgyzstani authorities. 
Kyrgyzstan is a signatory of sev-
eral international conventions protect-
ing the rights of refugees including the 
United Nations Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees. This convention 
obliges Kyrgyzstan not to return persons 
“who have a well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular 
social group, or political opinion … ;” 
are outside the country of their national-
ity; and are unable to return to it due to 
their fear of being persecuted. Kyrgyzstan 
and Uzbekistan are also signatories of the 
Minsk Agreement, signed by the mem-
bers of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS), which includes Russia and 
other former Soviet republics. Under this 
agreement, Kyrgyzstan is bound to protect 
the rights of citizens from CIS countries 
and is prohibited from extraditing persons 
in cases where the persons may be tortured. 
At the same time, the agreement requires 
a signatory state, such as Kyrgyzstan, to 
extradite persons when a fellow CIS mem-
ber state mandates their arrest for crimes in 
their home country, provided that a similar 
crime exists in the deporting country.
Uzbekistan, citing the Minsk Agreement, 
urges Kyrgyz authorities to return persons 
accused of crimes in the Andijan massa-
cre. To maintain good ties with its neigh-
bor and comply with its responsibilities 
under the Minsk Agreement, Kyrgyzstan 
extradited some refugees to Uzbekistan 
on the grounds that they faced criminal 
charges. Once extradited, however, the 
Uzbekistani government pressed political 
charges against them for engaging in oppo-
sition activity. Kyrgyzstan, however, does 
not retain a similar law banning political 
opposition. 
Over the past two years, the Kyrgyzstani 
government has exhibited two different 
approaches to the question of refugees 
from Uzbekistan. On the one hand, it 
has granted asylum to Uzbekistani refu-
gees under its obligations in international 
conventions. On the other hand, it has 
returned refugees to Uzbekistan under 
its obligations in the Minsk Agreement, 
under political pressure from Uzbekistan. 
Kyrgyzstan is torn between the interna-
tional and regional agreements to which 
it is part. While Kyrgyzstan ponders its 
approach to the Uzbekistani refugees, the 
refugees continue to live in fear that they 
may be extradited to Uzbekistan.
easT aNd souTheasT asia  
aNd The Pacific
NeW ausTRaliaN admiNisTRaTioN 
To close offshoRe  
deTeNTioN ceNTeR
Symbolizing the end of the much criti-
cized “Pacific Solution,” the Australian 
government began resettling 75 Sri Lankan 
refugees, the last group of asylum seekers 
detained on Nauru, a small island nation 
in Micronesia. As part of its 2007 plat-
form, the newly elected Labor Government 
promised to discontinue the practice of 
intercepting refugees seeking asylum 
before they reach Australia and detaining 
them on foreign territory.
Former Prime Minister John Howard 
initiated the Pacific Solution in response to 
the 2001 standoff between the Australian 
coast guard and a Norwegian cargo ship 
that had rescued 433 asylum seekers, many 
fleeing the war in Afghanistan. In what is 
known as the Tampa Crisis, the Australian 
navy first refused to allow the ship to 
disembark, then forcibly removed the pas-
sengers and shipped them to foreign ter-
ritories. New Zealand accepted 132 as 
refugees, while the rest were housed in 
detention camps in Nauru. The conser-
vative Howard Administration diverted 
asylum seekers abroad before they reached 
Australian territory as part of a package of 
policies designed to deter illegal immigra-
tion. In September 2001, the Parliament 
passed the Migration Amendment Act, 
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which excluded several of Australia’s 
island territories from Australia’s migra-
tion zone, expanded the Department of 
Immigration and Citizenship’s (DIAC) 
power to intercept asylum seekers at sea, 
and authorized the DIAC to process these 
people abroad.
The Migration Amendment Act limits 
the rights of asylum seekers who land in one 
of the excised island territories or who are 
intercepted at sea by the DIAC. Intercepted 
asylum seekers are only eligible for tempo-
rary three-month visas and can no longer 
apply for permanent Australian visas, even 
if refugee status is granted. The Refugee 
Review Tribunal cannot review intercepted 
asylum seekers’ cases instead of the DIAC, 
nor can the Immigration Minister overturn 
visa rejections on public policy grounds.
The Pacific Solution allows Australia 
to skirt its responsibilities to refugees 
under international law. Australia’s Human 
Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission 
admits that having different levels of rights 
for asylum seekers processed in Australia 
and on foreign territory violates the 1951 
Convention on the Status of Refugees 
(Convention). Nauru is not a signatory of 
the Convention, which allows Australia to 
circumvent limitations on the use of deten-
tion. Detaining asylum seekers should only 
be permissible if “brief, absolutely neces-
sary, and instituted after other options have 
been implemented.”
Under the Pacific Solution, detaining 
asylum seekers is standard procedure. 
Some detainees from the Tampa Crisis 
were held in the camps for nearly four 
years before being resettled. Detainees on 
Nauru are not provided with employment, 
housing, education, or naturalization in a 
manner that conforms to international reg-
ulations. They are not allowed to work or 
mingle with Nauruan citizens. Almost all 
detainees who have remained in the camps 
for an extended period of time have devel-
oped some type of mental illness, which 
has resulted in widespread insomnia and 
many instances of self-mutilation. When 
the camps opened in 2001, Nauru closed its 
borders, severely restricting the possibility 
of legal aid, and denied visas to Australian 
lawyers representing the detainees. 
Since 2001, Australia has detained 
more than 1,600 asylum seekers from 
countries such as Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, 
Pakistan, and Burma. The majority reset-
tled in Australia, New Zealand, or Europe; 
some voluntarily repatriated; and one died 
in camp. Australian officials intercepted 
a group of 83 asylum seekers fleeing the 
Sri Lankan civil war in February 2007. 
In September 2007, one of them went to 
Australia for medical treatment, 75 were 
granted refugee status, and on January 15, 
2008, 21 were settled in Australia. The 
other 54 recognized refugees will likely 
see the same resolution this year. The fate 
is less clear for the remaining seven who 
were not granted refugee status. Six face 
criminal charges for assaulting a Nauruan 
citizen.
When the Nauruan detention camps 
close, Australia will have spent over a bil-
lion dollars handling fewer than 1,700 ref-
ugees. The Pacific Solution was reportedly 
over 25 times more costly than processing 
asylum seekers at home. Furthermore, it 
failed to deter illegal immigration. 
The closure of the detention centers 
will leave the economically destitute 
island of Nauru without 20 percent of its 
Gross Domestic Product. After 90 years of 
intense phosphate mining by the British, 
Australians, and New Zealanders, Nauru, 
the smallest republic in the world, has no 
arable land or natural resources. Since 
gaining independence in 1968, Nauru 
built financial wealth from the phosphate 
industry. It later lost most of its capi-
tal and became a tax haven and money-
laundering center. Today 90 percent of 
the 13,528 Nauruans are unemployed. 
Nauruan Foreign Minister Kieren Keke 
publicly requested that Australia build a 
technical college on the island and provide 
guest worker visas for Nauruans. While 
Australian Federal Immigration Minister 
Chris Evans promised to continue to sup-
port Nauru financially, no specific plans 
have been finalized.
aseaN chaRTeR PRovides 
oPPoRTuNiTy To sTReNgTheN 
RegioNal humaN RighTs 
sTaNdaRds
Dr. Surin Pitsuwan may have more 
influence over the future status of human 
rights in Southeast Asia than any other 
person. Inaugurated on January 7, 2008, 
the Secretary General of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) begins 
his five-year term with the challenge of 
overseeing the ratification of the 40-year-
old regional organization’s first char-
ter. Drafted on November 20, 2007, the 
Charter would incorporate the ten mem-
ber nations (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, 
Laos, Malaysia, Burma, The Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam) into a 
legal entity, creating a European Union-
style economic partnership, and commit-
ting each country to shared principles of 
human rights and democracy. 
Although the new Charter calls for 
establishing an institution devoted solely 
to upholding human rights, its weak lan-
guage diminishes the prospect of enforcing 
international standards. The Charter does 
not mention norms such as those in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and does not allow ASEAN to suspend or 
terminate membership of a non-compliant 
nation. Currently only Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Thailand, and the Philippines have national 
human rights institutions. Even countries 
with these institutions have difficulty 
upholding human rights standards. In the 
past few years, Philippine security forces 
have extra-judicially killed hundreds of 
political activists and members of leftist 
political parties.
The Charter pays great deference to 
the autonomy of individual governments, 
despite having member states — for exam-
ple Burma — with long records of human 
rights abuses and resistance to interna-
tional pressure. Continuing a tradition of 
non-interference and consensus decision-
making, the Charter limits ASEAN’s abil-
ity to protect citizens from government 
abuses. Most recently the Burmese del-
egation prevented United Nations envoy 
Ibrahim Gambari from briefing ASEAN on 
the Burmese government’s bloody crack-
down of wide-scale anti-government pro-
tests in 2007.
The lengthy ratification process 
impedes implementation of improved 
human rights standards. The Charter calls 
for all ten countries to sign within a year. 
Singapore signed during Pitsuwan’s inau-
guration ceremony and remains the only 
country to ratify. Leaders of the Philippine 
Parliament threatened to reject the Charter 
unless the military dictatorship in Burma 
continued on page 46
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takes concrete steps toward reform, such 
as freeing opposition leader and political 
prisoner Aung San Suu Kyi. Suu Kyi has 
been under house arrest since her National 
League for Democracy party won Burma’s 
last democratic parliamentary elections in 
1990. 
The secretive manner in which the 
Charter was drafted also hinders the rati-
fication process. Civil service groups such 
as trade unions, alienated by the closed 
door sessions, actively oppose ratification 
without further input.
The Charter’s weak language and 
ASEAN’s undefined role necessitate strong 
leadership and vision from the Secretary 
General in order to mold ASEAN into a 
legitimate mechanism for upholding the 
rights of citizens. Described as a per-
suasive politician, Pitsuwan received his 
Ph.D. in political science and Middle 
Eastern studies from Harvard University 
in the United States, then ran for a posi-
tion in the Parliament in his home town of 
Nakhon Si Thammarat, Thailand, where 
he served nine terms and was appointed 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. After leaving 
the foreign ministry in 2001, Pitsuwan was 
appointed as a member of the Commission 
on Human Security of the United Nations 
and served as an advisor to the International 
Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty, which produced the well-
known Responsibility to Protect report. 
He also served on the International Labor 
Organization’s World Commission on the 
Social Dimension of Globalization. 
Whether the new ASEAN charter 
remains just an academic assertion of lofty 
goals or an institution of fundamental human 
rights depends largely on the decisions 
made in the next five years. Commissioners 
from the national human rights organiza-
tions of Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, 
and the Philippines met on January 29 to 
establish a framework for the proposed 
regional body, the ASEAN Human Rights 
Commission. During the two-day meeting, 
the commissioners proposed that members 
of the Commission be appointed by their 
respective foreign ministries from a list of 
candidates drawn by a selection commit-
tee consisting of national institutions and 
civil society. The proposal will go back 
to the four existing national commissions 
and individual national governments for 
further discussion before being submitted 
to ASEAN as a whole.   HRB
Matthew Solis, a J.D. candidate at the 
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Samphan referred to Pol Pot as a patriot 
and claimed that in the Khmer Rouge gov-
ernment “[t]here was no policy of starving 
people. Nor was there any direction set out 
for carrying out mass killings.” Samphan 
was charged with crimes against humanity 
and war crimes for his role in the Khmer 
Rouge regime.  HRB
Anna Katherine Drake, a J.D. candidate at the 
Washington College of Law, covers the ICTY 
for the Human Rights Brief.
Andrea Mateus, LL.M. in International Legal 
Studies, New York University School of Law 
(2007), wrote the Mikaeli Muhimana v. the 
Prosecutor summary for the Human Rights 
Brief.
Emily Pasternak, a J.D. candidate at the 
Washington College of Law, wrote the Aloys 
Simba v. the Prosecutor summary for the 
Human Rights Brief.
Rachel Katzman, a J.D. candidate at the 
Washington College of Law, wrote the 
Prosecutor v. Moinina Fofana and Allieu 
Kondewa summary for the Human Rights 
Brief.
Katherine Anne Cleary, Assistant Director 
of the War Crimes Research Office at 
the Washington College of Law, edited 
the Prosecutor v. Moinina Fofana and 
Allieu Kondewa, Mikaeli Muhimana v. the 
Prosecutor, and Aloys Simba v. the Prosecutor 
summaries for the Human Rights Brief.
Solomon Shinerock, a J.D. candidate at 
the Washington College of Law, covers the 
International Criminal Court for the Human 
Rights Brief.
Howard Shneider, a J.D. candidate at the 
Washington College of Law, covers hybrid 
and internationalized tribunals for the Human 
Rights Brief.
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